Events

Simone Weil and Ecological Ethics

This talk explores the French philosopher Simone Weil’s concept of “attention” and its connection to her often misunderstood concept of “decreation.” How could we conceivably apply this form of attention to ecological ethics? For Weil, attention is a necessary step in recognizing the ego-centric and autonomous self as insufficient and reductive, as we move toward a larger, more expansive sense of a relational self - a being that is part of a larger ecology, interconnected and bound to others. While Weil herself does not extend her philosophy into the realm of ecology or the environment, her work on attention as a necessity for living an ethical life is particularly relevant to considering how to embody an ecological ethics as a way of life.

After the talk, Dr. Kate Lawson will be in conversation with Dr. Adina Balint and the audience.

Dr. Kate Lawson is an Instructor in the department of philosophy at the University of Winnipeg. She is author of Ecological Ethics and the Philosophy of Simone Weil.

26 OCT 2026

12:30-1:30PM

3C14

All are welcome! Light refreshments will be served.

Join students, faculty, and staff in the Philosophy department to ring in the start of term!

Meet our newest faculty members, chat with new and returning students, and get to know the department.

14 SEPT 2026

12:30-1:30PM

3C14

All are welcome! Light refreshments will be served.

Dr. Steven Robinson, Brandon University

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

2:30-4:00pm

3M63

In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates seeks a definition of “piety” so as to defend himself at his upcoming trial. After several false starts Socrates brings the discussion to what looks like a culmination: just specify the product of the gods’ work, which the gods achieve by using humans as their servants, and Euthyphro will have supplied the definition of piety that Socrates needs. But Euthyphro balks, and the dialogue ends in aporia with Socrates bemoaning his failure to have learned anything.

Some scholars have suggested that it is not difficult for readers to infer a solution that Socrates (or Plato) was “hinting” at, i.e., that the gods’ work is to complete the growth of each human. In this paper I argue that we can be more specific if we look to Socrates’ Apology to see how his actual defense plays out. The reasoning in question (Euthyphro 11e-14b) analogizes piety with artisanal production, taking gods as the artisans. Then, like shipbuilders’ slaves helping to build ships, pious humans assist the gods in their production of complete humans. Piety emerges as the human obligation to assist others in becoming just or good and, hence, it is quite simply the opposite of “corruption.”

In Apology, Socrates’ defense implicitly uses this definition of piety, but also pushes it farther: he claims to be serving the god in his practice of philosophy; he recounts public evidence of how he has set the best example for Athenian youth; and—crucially—he insists that the unexamined life is not the life for a human being. Piety itself then must be understood to include Socratic philosophy, or the practice of critical thinking.

Implications include that Socrates is emphatically innocent at trial; that piety is not primarily a religious concept but a second-order moral concept; and that the main areas of life traditional piety touches on (religious observance; honouring the family; respecting the law) are not grounds of piety but rather instrumental means to the moral maturity of a community. Should religion, family or the laws ever get in the way of the production of good people, then piety must correct them.